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EXAMINING VETERANS’ INTEREST GROUPS:  UNDERSTANDING 
SUCCESS THROUGH INTEREST GROUP RATINGS 
 
Nicole E. Schiller  
 
Abstract 
While many legislative scholars have consistently concerned themselves with the 
motivations behind congressional votes, very little has been done to examine the specific 
motivations behind votes on veterans’ legislation.  By using the congressional ratings compiled 
by veterans’ interest groups as well as a variety of variables that may affect those ratings, this 
paper seeks to gain a deeper understanding of what factors contribute to the successes of 
individual veterans’ organizations.  It is concluded that, while some constituency characteristics 
did play a small role in explaining legislative successes, the majority of success is explained by 
both legislator party affiliation and ideology. 
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Introduction 
The passage of the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (G.I. Bill of Rights) was a 
landmark moment in American history.  In addition to providing American service people with a 
generous package of benefits, the bill also revealed the full power of the American veterans’ 
lobby.  While a variety of actors certainly played key roles in the drafting and passage of the 
legislation, veterans’ interest organizations emerged as a powerful pressure force capable of 
influencing the public, the media, and elected officials.  The success of the G.I. Bill of Rights, 
combined with several smaller legislative victories, has earned veterans’ organizations a 
respected position, both in American history and within halls of the Veterans’ Administration 
(Keller 1629).  Perhaps this is why the relative lack of research into those factors that influence 
the success of veterans’ organizations is so startling.   
 
The Veterans’ Lobby 
In order to examine the factors that may contribute to the legislative successes of the 
American veterans’ lobby, one must first look towards the differences within the lobby itself.  
Often assumed to be a single unified force, the 45 chartered veterans’ interest organizations that 
vie for the votes of U.S. congressmen are in fact quite diverse in both their motivations and their 
desires.  This diversity often contributes to different legislative agendas and significantly varying 
legislative ratings across groups.  The five groups examined within this paper were chosen to 
represent the varying perspectives, backgrounds, and resources within the veterans’ lobby.  
Understanding these organizations provides one with the necessary tools to begin investigating 
their relative influences and those factors that might make them more or less successful. 
The largest and traditionally most powerful of the veterans’ organizations is the 
American Legion (AL), which was formed in 1919 by veterans of the First World War (Bennett 
46).  Today the Legion is generally acknowledged as being America’s “most important veterans 
group” (Stavisky 130) as well as the group best equipped to lobby legislators.  Throughout the 
years, the Legion has made use of several unique and powerful lobbying strategies that have 
greatly contributed to their success relative to other organizations.  Examples of these include the 
presence of Legion Posts in most American congressional districts, as well as assigning a 
Legionnaire to work with each member of the House of Representatives.  Traditionally, Legion 
membership is “conservative and sincerely concerned […] and national security” (Stavisky 131).  
Also, because of the organization’s size, it can sometimes be slow to act, even when concerned 
with issues of great importance (Keller 1629).  
The Disabled American Veterans (DAV) was formed following World War I in an effort 
to offer “special programs” to those veterans who were injured or sickened during their service 
(Stavisky 132).  While the group maintains strong ties with the American Legion, it differs from 
the Legion in several ways.  Unlike the Legion, DAV has been hesitant to lobby on issues not 
directly pertaining to veterans (Keller 1629), but rather chosen to remain somewhat a-political in 
its intentions.  The DAV walks a fine line; for it aligns itself with both the larger, wealthier, and 
conservative American Legion as well those Vietnam Veterans who tend to lay to the left.  This 
is possible because the organization so rarely chooses to make a political statement; but instead 
lobbies almost exclusively for issues concerning disabled veterans.  
Those organizations formed later in the nation’s timeline remain distinct from the Legion 
and DAV.  With the G.I. Bill of Rights already in place, and thus some level of veteran’s 
assistance assured, these groups have been free to form around rather specific issues and military 
conflicts.  Chief among these organizations is American Veterans (AmVets).  Generally regarded 
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as a “second tier” organization, AmVets was formed by veterans whose primary goal was to 
provide an alternative to the powerful American Legion (Stavisky 133).  With little in the way of 
“wealth, experience, [and] clubhouses,” AmVets attracted young WWII G.I.’s with opportunities 
for immediate leadership positions (Stavisky 133).  Also, much like the DAV, AmVets has been 
careful to remain a-political.  When the group does speak out on an issue not immediately 
effecting veterans, it generally focuses on such bipartisan platitudes as patriotism, charity, and 
increased civic mindedness (Stavisky 133). 
 The Retired Enlisted Association (RE) was created in 1963 and works for the expressed 
purpose of “[enhancing] the quality of life for uniformed services enlisted personnel, their 
families and survivors-including active components, Reserves, and National Guard, and all 
retirees” (Retired Enlisted Association). With less wealth and membership than all previously 
mentioned groups, the Retired Enlisted Association very rarely takes a stand on issues that are 
not directly related to the interests of former enlisted service people. 
 Often considered the “outsider” among veterans interest organization, the Vietnam 
Veterans of America (VVA) have been the most vocal in criticizing the American Legion’s 
seemingly firm hold on the Veterans’ Administration (VA).  Unlike all of the above mentioned 
groups, the Vietnam Veterans of America’s roots lie firmly in the “anti-war [and] pro-amnesty 
movements” (Keller 1629).  The group was founded in 1978, when those veterans returning from 
the Vietnam War found that traditional veteran’s organizations did not meet their needs (Keller 
1629).  Differing greatly from those traditional groups, the Vietnam Veterans of America has 
focused its efforts on “unemployment, psychological readjustment difficulties, and exposure to 
the defoliant Agent Orange” (Keller 1629).   
 The Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Association (IAVA) is America’s youngest veterans’ 
interest group. Founded in 2004 by an Army First Lieutenant who served during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, the organization’s primary goal has been securing benefits for both veterans and active 
duty soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan ("About IAVA Action") While the group does 
lobby for political support, it also works to empower veterans within their communities by 
encouraging them to share stories regarding their experiences serving. 
 
Previous Research 
 The relatively small body of work regarding the factors that effect votes on veterans’ 
issues began with the benchmark study conducted by V.O. Key in 1943.  By comparing ratios of 
reelection, Key attempted to examine whether or not a Representative’s support for American 
Legion measures translated into electoral success or failure (28).  Key found that while “Friends 
of the Legion” generally tended to fair better when running for reelection, party seemed to play a 
far greater role in a Representative’s success than Legion support (33).  He also found that 
Republican Representatives from the Middle Atlantic States and Democratic representatives 
from the East South Central and West South Central seemed to “be able to ignore Legion 
lobbyists without endangering their political careers”(35).   While Key’s study focused only on 
the American Legion, and was conducted quite some time ago, it contributed a great deal to what 
is now assumed to be true about veterans’ interest groups. 
 
Competing Theories 
 Subsequent research in this area has dealt not with veterans’ interest groups, but with the 
motivations of legislators’ votes.  Downs, Buchanan and Tullok, and Olson approached this issue 
by applying the economic theory of “rational self-interested behavior” to the “political sphere” 
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(Kau, Keenan and Rubin 231; Downs; Buchanan and Tullok; Olson).  According to this model, 
Representatives cast votes based primarily on delivering benefits to, or fulfilling the desires of, 
their constituency.  More recently George Stigler conducted an analysis of government 
regulation and found that those legislators who best respond to the interests of their constituency 
are rewarded on Election Day (11).  In his 1974 piece evaluating various arguments surrounding 
political decisions, Richard Posner asserts that the success of the economic theory in areas 
outside of politics does much to support its feasible application to politics (356).  
 More recent literature has pointed towards a dramatically different explanation for voting 
behavior.  In 1990, Mark Zupan and Joseph Kalt examined whether personal ideology or 
constituent concerns play a greater role in a Representative’s voting decisions.  The two explain 
that if ideology is indeed the main motivator in the decision making process, political scientists 
will have to more heavily concern themselves with “hard-to-specify and hard-to-quantify matters 
such as culture, intellectual ideas and trends…” (104).  Indeed, it was their conclusion that 
legislators tend to indeed vote primarily based on their own convictions as opposed to acting 
solely as representatives of a given district’s interests (128).  This argument is echoed by the 
work of Douglas Nelson and Eugene Silberberg who, by examining the Senate, found that party 
affiliation, ideology, and vote-trading play significant roles in the decision making process 
(21,23).  Berstein and Horn reached a similar conclusion in their 1981 study of the reasons for 
votes on environmental policy (236).  After considering various theories regarding voting habits, 
the two concluded that legislator ideology and party affiliations have the most significant affect 
on votes (236, 245).   
 
Data and Model 
In order to examine the factors that contribute to the legislative successes of veterans’ 
interest organizations, and address the competing theories offered above, I present a model that 
measures the effects of both constituent and Representative characteristics on House votes.  As a 
dependent variable, I will be using the congressional ratings assigned to House legislators by the 
above mentioned veterans’ interest organizations.  These ratings reflect the extent to which a 
representative voted with a particular veterans’ organization on issues concerning that 
organization, and thus serve as an indicator of a group’s success.  The independent variables are 
listed below.  
 
District ideology.   This will be measured by using the percentage of each district that 
voted for George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election. Because the American 
Legion has traditionally been a staunch conservative group, I expect district ideology to 
contribute greatly to its legislative ratings.  I expect the same phenomenon to be true of 
the traditionally liberal Vietnam Veterans of America. District ideology is expected to 
play no role in the ratings of the nonpartisan AmVets. 
 
 The percentage of veterans in the district.  Whether or not a significant veteran 
 population exists in a district is predicted to greatly affect a Representative’s vote  on  
issues concerning veterans.  This is expected to hold true for all of the interest  
 groups tested. 
 
The region of the district.  Because of the national nature of those veterans’ groups used, 
I do not expect region to play a role in the influence exhibited by said veterans’ groups. 
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Defense employment within the district.  This variable will account for whether or not a 
substantial portion of a given districts’ employment comes from the defense sector, as 
determined by Congressional Quarterly’s: Politics in America.  Traditionally, the 
American Legion and our nation’s defense contractors have lobbied for some of the same 
things.  For this reason, I predict that the presence of a sizable defense plant within a 
district will improve the Legion’s ability to a push through its legislation.   
 
The presence of a military base within the district.  It seems intuitive that the presence of 
a military base within a district might motivate a Representative to vote for legislation 
that would benefit those employed by that base.  For this reason, I expect military bases 
to contribute to high interest group ratings.  This should prove especially true for the Iraq 
and Afghanistan Veterans’ Association as that organization is associated with the 
nation’s most recent military conflict, and those employed or residing at a base are likely 
to also be associated with that conflict.  
 
The party of the Representative.  As previously stated, the American Legion has 
traditionally aligned itself with conservative Representatives.  Thus, I expect Republican 
Representatives to demonstrate higher scores from this group then Democrats.  Likewise, 
I expect Democrats to demonstrate higher scores from the Vietnam Veterans of American 
than Republicans.  Again, I expect AmVets to remain unaffected, as the group is largely 
non-partisan. 
 
The veteran status of the Representative.  I predict that those legislators who have 
themselves served in the military will be naturally more likely to support veteran’s 
legislation.  
 
The number of terms served by the Representative.  The number of terms a 
Representative has served is expected to increase that Representative’s support for 
the American Legion.  This is because of the Legion strategy of assigning a Legionnaire 
to each member of Congress.  The more time one serves in office, the more likely they 
are to have fostered a relationship with that legionnaire.  
 
The Ideology of the Representative.  This will be measured by using legislative ratings 
calculated by the American Conservative Union (ACU).  Because the American Legion 
is a traditionally conservative group, I expect legislators with higher ACU scores to also 
have higher ratings from these groups.  Because the Vietnam Veterans Association is 
traditionally liberal, I expect high ACU scores to contribute to lower ratings from this 
group.  I expect this measure to prove insignificant for the AmVets in light of their 
dedication to non-partisanship. 
  
As there is a high potential for a Representative’s party and ideology to interact with one 
another, three regressions will be run for each of the abovementioned veterans’ interest groups.  
The first regression will include ideology, the second will include party, and the third will 
include both.  Through these tests, I hope to discover which of the independent variables most 
contributes to the successes of these different organizations. 
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Results and Analysis 
As previously noted, three tests were done for each of the five interest organizations.  The 
first of these tests examined the affect that the independent variables, excluding ideology, made 
on the scores of the different groups.  As is reflected in Table 1, the highest R2 is 78.9 for the 
Disabled American Veterans.  This would imply that the independent variables used were able to 
explain almost 80% of the variance in DAV success.  Party seemed to play the largest role in this 
with a beta of .72.  The variable was significant at the .001 level.  This implies that a Democratic 
Representative is more likely to contribute to a high DAV score than a Republican one.  District 
ideology also contributed a great deal with a beta of -.23.  Here we also see significance at the 
.001 level.  Because district ideology was measured in the percent per district that voted for 
George W. Bush in the 2004 Presidential Election, we can infer that a more liberal district is 
more likely to contribute to a high DAV score than a conservative one.  The percent of the 
district that is former or current military also proved statistically significant.  The American 
Legion, the oldest and most widely recognized veterans’ interest group, displayed the lowest R2 
with 8.1% of the variance explained by the included independent variables.  Party had the largest 
beta weight (.199) and was significant at the .001 level.  Similar to those results yielded by the 
DAV, this implies that a Democratic Representative would be more likely to contribute to an 
American Legion success than a Republican one.  Indeed, for four out of the five groups, party 
proved to be both significant and the major factor in explaining legislative success.  Also worth 
noting, of those four in which party was significant, all expressed that a Democratic 
Representative did more to explain legislative successes than a Republican one. 
 
TABLE 1      *= .05 level **=.01 ***.001 
Variable RE DAV IAVA AL VVA AMVET 
Party .52*** .72*** .62*** .199*** .197* -. 148 
Terms -. 144* 0.017 0.04 -0.05 -. 062 -. 555 
District ideology 0.01 -.23*** -.049 0.157 0.109 -. 049 
Military population .144** 0.005 0.024 0.068 0.047 0.051 
Veteran status 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.009 -.028 
Defense industry 0.043 0.027 -0.065 -0.003 0.018 -.602 
Presence of base 0.34* 0.046 0.06 0.03 0.039 0.007 
New England .121* 0.034 0.056 0.098 0.043 0.128 
Mid Atlantic 0.099 0.018 0.144** 0.196** 0.016 0.042 
East North Central 0.045 0.13 .131* 0.151 0.083   
West North Central 0.082 0.022 .102* .151* 0.098 0.106 
South Atlantic 0.077 0.03 0.065 .180* 0.004 . -048 
East South Central 0.136* . -02* .125* 0.131 0.03 0.004 
West South Central .138* .086*** 0.01 0.054 0.03 -.004 
Mountain 0.03  0.06 .15* 0.045 0.054 
Pacific -.222*         -.19* 
R2 30 78.9 42.5 8.1 8.7 10 
 
Region also contributed to Legion scores, with four of the nine region categories showing 
some level of significance.  The greatest of these is the Mid Atlantic with a beta of .196 and 
significance at the .01 level.  The South Atlantic, Pacific, and West North Central variables 
showed significance at the .05 level.   
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Of the remaining groups one can note that The Retired Enlisted Association (RE) was the 
only group in which the number of terms served by a Representative or the military population of 
the district showed any significance.  With a beta of -.144 at the .05 level, we see that for the RE, 
the number of terms a Representative serves seems to lessen that Representative’s support for RE 
measures.  With a beta of .144 and significance at the .01 level, it seems that the higher a military 
population, the greater the likelihood of a Representative supporting an RE measure. 
Table 2 shows regression results for the second version of the test.  As previously stated, 
this series of regressions includes the ideology variable, and excludes the party variable.  Once 
again, DAV has the highest R
 2, although it is down 9 points from the previous figure.  Most of 
the affect on DAV scores seemed to come from ideology, with a beta weight of -.711 at the .001 
level.  Because ideology was measured using ratings provided by the American Conservative 
Union, we are able to infer that the more conservative a Representative is, the less of a positive 
contribution that Representative makes to a high DAV score.  Remaining consistent with Table 
1, district ideology also proved significant at the .001 level.  Its beta decreased only slightly, 
once again implying that the more conservative a district the less likely it is that the district’s 
Representative will contribute to high DAV scores. 
 
TABLE 2      *= .05 level **=.01 ***.001 
Variable RE DAV IAVA AL VVA AMVET 
Ideology -.464*** -.711*** -.59*** -.151 -.17** -.005 
Terms -.117* .009 .031* -.056 -.153 .108 
District ideology -.50 -.204*** -.056 .114 -.153 .108 
Military population .181*** 0.058 0.0.073 .1 -.098 .052 
Veteran status -.021 -.041 -.02 .001 -.10 .009 
Defense industry 0.044 -.005 0.064 -.02 -.063 -.052 
Presence of base .074 .009 .007 -.039 0.022 -.009 
New England .108* .028 .037 .04 -.004 .11 
Mid Atlantic .078 .004 .155* .152* -.058 .206 
East North Central .035 .13 .127*   .097 
West North Central .099 .049 .121* -.079 -.042 .107 
South Atlantic .108 .072* .108 .073 -.070   
East South Central .176 .037 .173 .125 -.033 .063 
West South Central .169 .130*** .115* .188 -.058 .022 
Mountain 0.048 0.051 0.072 0.064 0.025 0.046 
Pacific      -.068 -.032 -.16 
R2 23 70 36 6.3 10 10 
 
The R2 for the American Legion fell slightly upon the replacement of the party variable 
with the ideology variable.  Surprisingly, ideology proves to be insignificant for the American 
Legion.  With the introduction of the ideology variable, the only variable that is able to remain 
significant for the American Legion is the Mid Atlantic one, which was significant only at the 
.05 level.  From this one can imply that a legislator’s party plays a far greater role in their 
support for Legion measures than their individual ideology. 
 The Vietnam Veterans of America was the only group whose R2 increased with the 
addition of the ideology variable.  For this group, ideology was the only significant factor.  It had 
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a beta weight of -.17 and was significant at the .01 level.  One will note that the R2 for the 
American Veterans remained the same despite the addition of the new variable, and neither 
ideology nor party proved significant. 
 Table 3 shows the results from the series of regressions that included both the party and 
ideology variables.  One will notice that, once again, the Disabled American Veterans R2 is 
significantly higher than all of the others, explaining 80% of the variance in the group’s ratings.  
Both party and ideology are significant at the .001 level with party having a beta weight of .53 
and ideology having one of -.347.  We also see that district ideology remains significant even 
though it decreased significantly when both party and ideology are considered.    
 Party and ideology once again remain insignificant for the American Veterans; however 
through the combination of the two the number of regional variables increase in significance.  
These regional variables, however, are only significant at the .05 level. 
 The R2 for all remaining groups increases when these two variables work together.  For 
the American Legion and Vietnam Veterans Association this increase is only slight and neither 
party nor ideology proves significant, however the R2 for the Retired Enlisted Association and 
the Iraq and Afghanistan Association of Veterans increase dramatically 
 
TABLE 3        *= .05 level **=.01 ***.001 
Variable RE DAV IAVA AL VVA AMVET 
Party 0.45 .53*** .50*** 0.092 0 0 
Ideology -0.144 -.347***  -0.089 -0.167 -0.074 
Terms .144* 0.02 0.032 -0.075 -0.058 0.014 
District ideology 0.046 -.121** 0.044 0.114 -0.157 -0.108 
Military population .143** 0.016 0.03 0.104 0.103 0.109 
Veteran status -0.009 -0.029 -0.005 0.01 -0.008 0.054 
Defense industry 0.041 0 0.068 -0.24 0.062 0.006 
Presence of base .098* 0.025 0.042 -0.337 -0.021 0.052 
New England .133* -0.022 0.042 0.072 0.015 .17* 
Mid Atlantic 0.087 0.005 .130** .162* -0.052 .209* 
East North Central 0.049 0.023 .142** 0.06 0.03 .232* 
West North Central 0.086 0.04 .106* 0.119 0.062 .197* 
South Atlantic 0.091 .062* 0.083 0.125 -0.042 0.137 
East South Central .141** -0.001 .134** .172* -0.01 .164* 
West South Central .147* .11** 0.008 0.061 -0.034 0.137 
Mountain 0.04 0.036 0.063 0.099 -0.005 0.137 
  Pacific     -0.231       
  R2 30.5 80 43.9 7.2 10.3 8.6 
 
 One should pay special attention to those variables that remain significant across the 
three tables.  For the Disabled American Veterans district ideology remains significant, slipping 
from the .001 level to the .01 level only when both the party and ideology variables are both 
included.  For both DAV and the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Association, the significance of 
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party and ideology does not seem to waver as much as either is excluded or included.  We also 
see that for the Iraq and Afghanistan Association the Mid Atlantic, East North Central, and West 
North Central regions remain significant.  For the Retired Enlisted Association, terms, New 
England, and the percent population serving or having served in the military also retains its 
significance.  
 
Discussion 
 From this analysis, we see that many of the hypotheses originally posed were disproved.  
District ideology, while it did prove to be significant in some instances, did not do so in the cases 
of the American Legion or the Vietnam Veterans of America, the two groups that were predicted 
to see the most affect from this variable.  While both were consistent in following a trend, with 
the American Legion favoring more conservative districts and the Vietnam Veterans favoring 
more liberal ones, these indicators are rather small and do little to confirm the original 
hypothesis.  The hypothesis regarding the nonpartisan nature of AmVets proved itself true as 
district ideology remained insignificant. 
 Both Representative ideology and party disproved the original hypothesis surrounding the 
American Legion.  Generally considered the most conservative of veterans’ groups, it was 
predicted that both conservative ideology as well as affiliation with the Republican Party would 
contribute greatly to higher Legion scores.  This hypothesis however, proved to differ greatly 
from findings that revealed party and ideology having little affect on Legion ratings.  In addition, 
in the one instance of significance, we saw that a Democratic Representative seemed to more 
heavily account for the Legion’s legislative successes.  AmVets once again remained nonpartisan 
in that neither party nor ideology had a significant effect on scores 
The percentage of veterans within the district was also expected to be significant for each 
group, as a veteran constituency might make a representative more sympathetic towards veteran 
measures.  This variable proved to be significant only for the Retired Enlisted Association, 
indicating that perhaps either constituent concerns do not necessarily translate into votes or 
veterans have remained relatively quiet in demanding votes from their Representatives.  I also 
expected the veteran status of a Representative to prove itself both significant and important in 
producing high group scores.  This was predicted to be observable for each group.  Quite the 
opposite revealed itself to be true as the variable was insignificant for every group.  In fact, while 
insignificant, many groups indicated that a Representative who had previously served in the 
military actually   slightly contributed to lower group ratings.   
 Both the hypotheses surrounding the number of terms served by a Representative and the 
Legion of the district both proved incorrect.  The number of terms, predicted to increase Legion 
scores, was found insignificant and in each instance showed that increased terms may decrease 
the overall score.  Region, predicted to be insignificant due to the widespread nature of these 
groups, tended to be significant for all groups with the exception of the Vietnam Veterans 
Association. 
Finally, hypotheses regarding the presence of defense employment and the presence of a 
military base within a district also proved incorrect. Substantial defense employment was 
insignificant for every group in all three tests.  The presence of a military base also did not prove 
itself significant for the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans’ Association who had been expected to 
see some portion of their successes come from this variable.  The presence of a base did however 
remain significant for the Retired Enlisted Association.  This group seemed to benefit at least 
somewhat from the presence of a military base within a district.   
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Limitations 
 Chief among this project’s limitations is the absence of a variable pertaining to campaign 
contributions or donations.  It seems logical that this variable would have played a significant 
role in the successes exhibited by veterans’ interest groups.  However, obtaining information 
regarding donations by groups per congressional district proved itself to be a near impossible 
task. Because membership fees, donations, and contributions are often taken in at the local level 
and then redistributed by the national organization, no measure for this factor was found. 
 Little has been written examining the influence of veterans’ interest groups.  A significant 
body of research in this area may have provided valuable insights into which additional factors 
might affect the legislative successes of these groups.  The low R2 demonstrated by some of the 
groups might have been made considerably higher if more variables had been considered. 
 Additionally, there is currently some debate about the legitimacy of using ratings as a 
measure of ideology.  Some argue that using ratings in this way displays a bimodality of 
ideology that is not actually present.  This has the potential to cause some discrepancies 
concerning the ideology variable, however, as no alternative was available, the ratings were a 
necessary part of the model.   
 Finally, not all legislative ratings are created equal, and while for the most part those 
ratings created by our five groups appear to be both sound and reliable, groups tend to be rather 
quiet on explaining how their individual ratings are compiled.  The more roll-call votes an 
organization chooses to include in its ratings, the more likely we are to see increased variation 
among scores.  Some of the groups included had significantly smaller legislative agendas, thus 
creating less variation in ratings.  
 
The Need for a Deeper Understanding 
 Perhaps, more than anything else, this research reveals the necessity for further 
investigation into the topic of those factors influencing veterans’ interest organizations.  Whether 
or not it was the intention of those who passed the G.I. Bill of Rights, that piece of legislation has 
come to symbolize a promise that the nation and the government made to its service people.  
Veterans’ interest groups hold the charge of watching over this promise, and assuring that it is 
never broken.  By more precisely defining those factors that contribute to the success of these 
groups, researchers may eventually be able to use those factors to determine which group has the 
greatest potential for ensuring veterans’ benefits.   
Furthermore, future scholars could use the variables featured in this model to continue 
investigating whether it is constituent desires or legislator ideology that motivate voting 
behavior.  A significant body of work, revealing those factors that contribute to ratings from a 
collection of America’s foremost interest organizations may provide a considerable insight into 
this topic. 
 
Conclusions 
The results found in this piece seem to significantly contradict much of what has been 
assumed about veterans’ interest groups.  Most dramatic of these findings is the behavior of the 
American Legion.  The group, traditionally known for its adherence to conservatism, seems to 
award higher scores to Democratic Representatives with liberal ideology than Republican 
Representatives with conservative ideology.  Similarly, the Vietnam Veterans of American, the 
group with the strongest ties to liberal ideology, showed significantly less liberal characteristics 
than other groups.  These findings obviously point the necessity for more research into this area.   
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Understanding those factors that motivate voting on veterans’ issues provides important 
tools, both for building a more effective veterans’ lobby and for deepening our knowledge on 
congressional voting behavior.  While little has been written addressing the former of these 
concerns, our current military involvements may soon require a better understanding of those 
who protect veterans’ benefits.  Speaking to the latter, the emergence of party and ideology as 
the primary motivators in this model coincides with the findings of recent scholars who have 
previously investigated those factors that contribute to voting behavior. Where this model is 
concerned, constituent characteristics and desires played a relatively small role in explaining 
legislative success.  While, obviously this does not prove or disprove either the rational self-
interest approach to voting behavior or the approach based on ideology, it does provide an 
instance of the latter outweighing the former. 
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Appendix 
 
In order to compile the dataset necessary for this model, a number of different sources 
were used.   
 
Ratings information was obtained through the Project Vote Smart as well as the  
veterans’ organizations themselves. Numerous conversations with Dean Stoleen, a staff 
member in the Legislative Action Department at the American Legion, were necessary to 
verify some Legion ratings.  In addition, ratings for the Disabled American Veterans 
were received by request, though the organization’s Legislative Action Center.  This was 
done to confirm and verify Vote Smart ratings. 
 
The ratings used to measure legislator ideology were accessed via the website of the 
American Conservative Union. 
 
Information on district ideology, party affiliation, veteran status, defense employment, 
and the presence of a military base was obtained through the use of CQ’s Politics in 
America 2006: the 109th Congress, as well as CQ’s Politics in America 2002: The 107th 
Congress. 
 
The measure for the percent of the district population that is either a member or the 
retired or active military was obtained through data from the 2000 U.S. Census, summery 
file 3.   
 
 
